The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interests

cornerst unrivalled and save(a)The semi semi insurance-making up salary step-ups in the Arab origination during 2011 undeniably transform the middle(a) eastern and the mating of Africa (MENA) (Dalacoura, 2012 63). An explosive mix of deepening policy-making grievances and a series of socio- frugalal problems, much(prenominal) as high unemployment, especi eachy among youth, rottenness, internal neighbourhoodal and loving inequalities, and the deterioration of economic conditions were the third e atomic number 18a causal f answeror behind all the uprisings (ibid 66-67).Inter casely, these uprisings create had profound consequences for the pursuit of long-standing linked States (U.S.) constitution goals and interests in the sh ar, with regard to constituental protective covering, vigor supplies, troops access, bilateral ex falsify and investment, counter-proliferation, counter alarmism, and the promotion of human rights (Arieff et al. 2012). The profound mi scellaneas in the region may alter the exemplar in which these goals atomic number 18 pursued and dispute the basic assumptions that dumbfound long command U.S. policies in the supra national carcass (Keiswetter, 2012 1). Regionally, the contagious nature of the uprisings, which bewildered in Tunisia in celestial latitude 2010 and later on break up to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain or Syria (Dalacoura, 2012 63), led either to the overthrow of dictators or to internal fracturing (ibid 66). part Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia underwent troubled transitions out from authoritarian regimes, in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, modest protests produced provisional steps to state of ward remediate (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 41).In interpret of such differences, policy makers in the U.S. have adopted case-by-case (and highly unequal) approaches, which strand from tacit escort to outright host interference (Shore, 2012). For instance, in countries such as Yemen or Saudi-Arabian Arabia , the U.S. has turned a blind eye to governmental corruption and human rights violations. In non-allied countries, how of all time, the like Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, the U.S. has condemned peremptory practices, paying backd sanctions and even wars in the name of majority rule (Shore, 2012).It could be turn overd, thus, that the U.S. chemical reaction to the events of the Arab take shape has been chary and contradictory at the selfsame(prenominal) time. On the unityness hand, Obamas disposal has been criticized for its unmixed lack of a arranged approach, and its pull up stakesingness to gurgle of participatory i lie withs opus defend national interests. On the opposite hand, tide overers have praised both(prenominal) the pragmatism and principle as a smart approach to humans-wide personal business (Kitchen, 2012 53).Within this fabric, this publisher testament appraise the dissemble of the so-called Arab inception on the US objectives regarding go vernmental and economic amend prospects for the core atomic number 99 pink of my John negotiations, energy issues, and security concerns. The chief(prenominal) hypothesis of this report card is, thus, that as part of the accepted external dust, where the concept of security acquires multiple and much(prenominal) mixed dimensions that go beyond army terms, the U.S. policies in the nerve centre due east are extremely shy and cautious. This paper argues that this unequivocal cautiousness and what mevery call a contradictory opposed policy of the U.S. is the head of a series of economic interests to conserve anoint-flows and global security concerns that tush non be disregarded in the semi semi semi governmental transnationalist arena. The U.S., thus, faces the knotty position of accompaniment its ideal of body politic and values on the one hand, and its long-run interests and security concerns on the other(a).This essay, thus, is divided in dickens main s ections. On the one hand, a brief metaphysical primer coat on world childlike relations (IR) theories result serve as a bum to understand the motifs and approaches of the U.S. forwardign policy in the region. On the other hand, an analysis of the onetime(a) and current U.S. interests and policies in the center of attention eastern allow reveal the contradictions and concerns of the current U.S. Administration and the possible outcomes. contrary insurance through the Lenses of transnational RelationsIn aver to understand the U.S. foreign policy in the international system and much specifically in the Middle due east, with its wide encompassing spectrum of foreign policy decisions, this paper shall approach the issue from the theoretical framework of International Relations (IR) (Vale, 2012 6).The International SystemThe international system, driven mainly by states, bureaufulness, and anarchy, has had a profound effect on the linked States since its inception (Vale, 2012 8).It could be say that thither are three main variant forms of the international system the multipolar, the bipolar and the unipolar system. Tin the multipolar system, there are some(prenominal)(prenominal) neat major creators influencing international politics and competing for control condition (Vale, 2012 10). Bipolar systems, could be described as a battle of titans of sorts as it happened betwixt the unify States and the Soviet Union during the frigid struggle-, namely, where dickens major powers oppose one another for dominance in the system. Finally, the unipolar system, is when there is one superpower and no other major powers in the international system such as the papistical Empire or the United States afterward(prenominal) the fall of the Soviet Union until arguably the beginning of the 2003 contend in Iraq (ibid 10).It stack be said that contemporary international politics does not fit any of these models. Neverthe slight, during the last decade a innovative structure seems to have appeared the uni-multipolar system. This system has a single world superpower merely with several major powers around it in the system which constrains the superpower so that it laughingstocknot act as if it were within a unipolar international system (Vale, 2012 10). Some authors, like Huntington, argue that this scenario is closest one to the current international system where the directtlement of international issues requires work by the single superpower, the United States, precisely always with some cabal of other major states (1999).Indeed, twenty-first nose lay aboutdy scholarship within IR moves forward from the primacy of the state and second order analyses towards the blood that individuals have within the international system. This apt movement reflects experiences in international write up that diminish the fictitious character of the state and strengthence the humans and humanity into the heart of a discipline whose ori gins lie in the motivation for action. This alteration is a twenty-first speed of light phenomenon with experiential roots in the terror attacks of 9/11, the Global monetary Crisis, the Arab rise uprisings, and the rise of hacktivism. These global, historical experiences are further the rise of cutting-edge and basal IR hypothesis that embraces complexity and multidisciplinarity (Op tryo, 2013). In other words, the trend within IR system is mirroring the shared experiences of the 21st century re natural emphasis on terror, revolutions against inequality and social-immobility, and the achiever of hacktivism (ibid.).According to the Neoclassical Realism theory of IR, the international system determines how states act and express towards each other beca routine the international system is anarchic and states compete for status quo power (Rose, 1998146). In other words, the scope and ambition of a countrys foreign policy is driven first and fore near by its point in the i nternational system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (ibid.). The 21st Century, however, is marked not with the political maneuvering of great states with competing visions, but with the elite few accumulating power, on the one hand, and the general creation, rejecting such elitism, on the other. The first movement toward a alteration of the status quo interpretation of the international system was the 9-11 terrorist attacks. The reaction against this new kind of oppositeness and the war on terrorism exemplified an historic reengagement with the social contract the state, the sovereign authority of the populate, was no longer the only free actor in the international political arena (Oprisko, 2013).Closely related to the appendage of the above-mentioned new enemies there is the mixture of the security concept during the last decades. Authors such as Ole Waever or Barry Buzan were some of the most predominant constructivists who define security af ter the parky War, which included non-traditional portions such as human rights (Layman, 2012 4).The place of human rights in security is widely debated. Although originally the Cold War security was traditionally define in military terms, since Realism was the main school of thought, Constructivism argued for different perspectives, permitting the most sodding(a) definition for security and national interests due(p) to its ability to allow for assortment in the perception of what defines nemesiss (Layman, 2012 6).Indeed, as Barry Buzan argues, social norms and heathenish phenomena dictate what is a security threat (Layman, 2012 6). Waever and Buzan define security as perceived threats to anything such as the traditional sentiment of a state to non-traditional views of threats (Buzan et al. 1998 7) which include society, the environs, and economic laws. Threats are, thus, divided into different sectors the military sector, come to with the armed capabilities of a state the political sector, concerned with the stability of a state the economic sector, concerned with the accessibility to re character references and the foodstuff the societal sector, concerned with the security and sustainability of refining and the environmental sector, concerned with the security of resources (Layman, 2012 8).Thus, the Financial Crisis in 2008 and the subsequent austerity endured by common citizens hit a breaking-point with the self-annihilation of Tarek al-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia in 2010. Dignity-filled rage erupted across four continents as the Arab quail stagger across the Middle East and mating Africa and Occupy protests engulfed Europe and nitrogen the States (Oprisko, 2013). As we progress from the competing idealist traditions of the twentieth Century, the emphasis from structural impositions are decline (ibid.). human being social agents and social structures are vernacularly constitutive, and social change idler proceed causally in bo th directions simultaneously from agents to structures and from structures to agents (Bennett, 2003 489)U.S. Contradictory Approach to the Middle EastBearing in mind the previously described theoretical framework, the core Ameri quite a little national interests at stake in the Middle East over decades should not come as a surprise namely protecting the U.S. homeland from the threats international terrorism and weapons of book destruction ensuring the free flow of oil, critical to the U.S., regional, and global economies ensuring the security of Israel (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48) discouraging interstate date that can threaten ally and other interests ensuring transit and access to facilities to patronage U.S. military operations countering terrorism and stemming the proliferation of weapons (Arieff et al., 2012 1). everyplace the years, these interests have resulted a series of U.S. policy objectives advancing ArabIsraeli peace, protecting hear oil-producing states, limiting the spread of regional conflicts, or ensuring U.S. military access and freedom of action within the region. Consequently, to ensure these objectives, the US has unremarkably behaved as a status quo power in the Middle East, prioritizing the regional relaxation of power and a certain order over backing political change (ibid).During the past 50 years, the U.S. has played two dueling roles in the Middle East, that of a factor of liberal ideals, willing to wage war to build res publica, and that of a supporter of dictators who follow to American interests and ensure stability (Shore, 2012). It can be said, thus, that the U.S. reaction to the Arab Spring uprisings has exemplified these two opposing policies. duration the US was officious to defend the peaceful protesters in Egypt and ladened citizens of Libya, taking any necessary measures to bar gross human-centered crimes, the U.S. has issued little more than formal warnings to the fact that Syrians are be killed under Assads rule, Bahrain is cracking peck on protestors, and Yemen is moving towards disaster (ibid.).However, the U.S. shipment to stability and the status quo partly poke out the regional stagnant economic, political and social systems, terzettoing to the rise of Islamism and Salafism. later failing to overthrow the authoritarian regimes of the region, from the 1990s, terrorism came to focus. Thus, and especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the hegemonic interest in the Saudi monarchy -as the largest oil producer- came into conflict with American national security priorities (Kitchen, 2012 54).However, after 9-11 the U.S. immovable that the regions authoritarian regimes were truly the root of the terrorist problem, prescribing, thus, res publica as the base to the Middle Easts socio-economic issues (Kitchen, 2012 54). Thus, in 2003, the bush-league Administration launched the Freedom agendum, asserting that stability could not be purchased at the expense of liberty, emphasizing that promoting democracy was not just about promoting American values, but was in the American national interest, since oppressive regimes created the conditions for radicalization and terrorism (ibid).However, the Freedom docket as part of the wider war on terror had obvious contradictions. tour on the one hand the US was seek short-term counter-terrorism measures through the security instrument of allied authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, it was prioritizing the long emancipation of Middle east societies to address the deeper roots of marginalization and underdevelopment (Kitchen, 2012 54).It could be argued that these contradictions were the background to the US response to the events of the Arab Spring (Kitchen, 2012 55).The Obama Administration and the U.S. Strategy In The Middle EastEven though the uprisings and political change in the Arab world have challenged many of the assumptions that have long informed U.S. policy makers, it can be said that ma ny long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure (Arieff et al. 2012 1).The Bush nerves response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, tip-tilted this preference for the status quo. The invasion of Iraq created a power vacuum in the gulf that Iran tried to fill. The war exhausted the U.S. military, spread sectarianism and refugees throughout the region, and unleashed a complaisant war. The Global War on nemesis alike brought the US into far more collaboration with Arab security operate (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48). The Bush system failed to match its rhetoric on democracy with meaningful support for elective change (ibid).The legacies of Obamas predecessors war on terror had to be addressed, in order improve the US credibility and standing in the MENA region (Kitchen, 2012 55). Thus, during President Obamas first term, the U.S. announce its desire for a fresh start with the Muslim world, which started by withdrawing the U.S. military bearing from Iraq and scaling d own the worst excesses of the War on Terror, while saying a lower-key counter-terrorism campaign. While the face has not managed to re discharge the Iranian nuclear challenge, it has assembled an international consensus and rigorous sanctions to jam Tehran. Obama also made the peace cultivate a top priority, although his efforts proved no more successful than his predecessors. hence the Arab Spring erupted, reshaping the regional agenda (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).It has been said that the events of the Arab Spring took Obamas Administration by surprise and underprepared (Kitchen, 2012 55). While the political emend was in the overarching interests of the US, and was both sustainable in the region and compatible with Americas other priorities (ibid 56), the White House, however, was worried that over-enthusiastic American support could undermine the revolutions authenticity. Thus, Obamas rhetoric in public was cautious, as he sought to balance competing interests in the backgro und of uncertain events, while at the same time the administration used its long-developed relationships in the region to try to shape developments (ibid.).Egypt constitutes a clear example of this delicate situation. While the clear win for the Muslim mating did not fall within the U.S. s expectations and interests in that country in particular, the pursual military coup, although morally questionable (at least(prenominal) in the 21st Century), has hardly been challenged. Indeed, having a military regime that wants to maintain the peace with Israel, is probably the most comfortable survival for the U.S. in a region where goose egg is settled so far.Despite the long changes across the Middle East ever since 2011, there are still several rapidly evolving dynamics that any workable U.S. strategy must account for. First, the so-called Arab Spring has altered key regional dynamics, regime perceptions of internal and external threats, and the role of different political actors, whereby a mobilized public opinion has an unprecedented role in regional politics. Second, Iranian nuclear and hegemonic ambitions continue to worry its neighbors, Israel, and the West. Third, while al-Qaeda has suffered organisational and political setbacks, its affiliates have adapted in disconcerting ways. Fourth, the IsraeliPalestinian issue continues to be a core element of regional instability and a source of potential violence (Khal and Lynch, 2013 41).The Arab Spring and the US Interests Challenges and OpportunitesIn response to the Arab uprisings, the Obama Administration has taken a re dynamical approach, trying to adjust U.S. regional policies while coping with multiple on-going crises (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).In 2011, when addressing the impact of the Arab Spring on U.S. interests, Obama admitted the unsustainability of the status quo and advocated relations based not only on mutual interests and mutual respect but also on a set of principles, including opposition to the use of violence and repression support for a set of customary rights and support for political and economic reform in the MENA region that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region (Keiswetter, 2012 4).However, contradictions were again inevitable. Although the administration recognized the importance of seeking to change in Egypt and across the region, it was quickly pulled up at the prospect of confrontation with Saudi Arabia over a possible political transformation in Bahrain (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Similarly, while the administration recognized the need for popular change in the region, allowing, thus, the popular process to develop even when elections produced Islamist victors (as it happened in Tunisia and Egypt), it always resisted calls for a more costly and risky noise in Syria (ibid.).Despite the Administration embrace democratic reform and public engagement, a workable strategy to implement these principles has still to be put in place (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Indeed, even when sensible policies were pursued, they have oftentimes not been communicated strategically, which transmits uncertainty about American priorities in the region.Given the current environment in the Middle East, any endeavour to draw a more coherent approach must consider pentad strategic dilemmasFirst, maintaining the free flow of oil may require robust security ties with Gulf regimes, which would increase the U.S. dependence on the least democratic and iron-fist ruling governments in the region. This dependence would undermine the U.S. soft power with the Arab public and may contribute to the uphill SunniShiite Cold War in the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Saudis, among others, have been able to compensate for the disruptions scramd by the Libyan events. Thus, a strong US commitment to the security of the Gulf will be vital to oil foodstuff stability in the future (Keiswetter, 2012 2). It could be said, thus, that the main challenge for the U.S. here will be being able to maintain traditional allies while supporting the democratic values it has been forever defending.Second, while a U.S. presence throughout the region and close cooperation with partner governments security services may be necessary for combating terrorism, this American military presence in the Arab world will continue to provide extremists with propaganda and recruitment opportunities (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Arab Spring uprisings, based on universal values and rooted in the ask for jobs, justice and dignity, highlight the bankruptcy of Muslim extremism sanctioning violence as the only way to obtain societal changes (Keiswetter, 2012 2). While none of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had an Islamist agenda (Dalacoura, 2012 74), Islamist movements have proved to benefit from them politically (ibid 75). Indeed, the upheavals provide opportunities, as it happened in Yemen, for Islamic extremists to gain ground (Keiswetter, 2012 2). As exemplified before with the case of Egypt, the U.S. faces the challenge of having Islamist regimes freely elect in stagnant countries, whereby radical movements are like to mushroom, or take an active role in the future political direction of the region, which will probably lead to international criticism.Third, tilting toward Israel in the Palestinian conflict may be essential to promise Washingtons commitment to Israels security (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50). However, Israeli leaders argue that the wave of unrest in the Arab world is endangering Israels security by potentially replacing relatively friendly bordering governments with Islamist and potentially hostile governments (Arieff et al., 2012 3).Fourth, a emphasised military U.S. intervention in Syria could make the demise of Assads regime, reduce humanitarian suffering, demonstrate leadership, and weaken Iran. However, such intervention would also require a major investmen t of military resources, returning the US to the protracted commitment that it just take flight in Iraq, and consuming resources necessary to deal with Iran and other global contingencies (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50).Fifth, the unclear prospects for democratic change. The consensus in Washington from the 1990s has been that democratisation will lead to the surfacence in the Middle East of regimes which are accessary of the U.S. (Dalacoura, 2012 78). However, the Middle East has been described as immune to the waves of democratization which have transformed other regions. Moreover, focusing attention on democracy in the Middle East has been criticized for reflecting the priorities of western and in particular American political science (ibid 71). On political and economic reform, the nature of the democratic political systems in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya ashes to be seen (Keiswetter, 2012 2). Indeed, one of the U.S. greatest fears is credibility in what new Middle East will emerge f rom the current turmoil (Shore, 2012).Sixth, it can be said that Irans nuclear and regional hegemonic aspirations are one of the major pre-Arab Spring concerns for the US. It is feared that a nuclear-armed Tehran would increase its support for militancy, terrorism, and subversion in the Levant, Iraq, and the Gulf, which would further destabilise the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). Thus, Irans nuclear schedule could have a decisive impact on regional politics (ibid.).Seventh, the Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. Both the U.S. and Europe are abstracted the necessary financial resources to shape prospects in the Arab Spring countries. Thus, investment will also have to come from countries, such as the Gulf states or China, who do not share to the same extent the horse opera interest in reinforcement of democratic values (Keiswetter, 2012 2).In any case, the eventual(prenominal) strategic effects of these changes are not clear. Many fear the acclivitous power of Islamist movements, elected or violent (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). The anti-American protests in September 2012 in response to a YouTube video, and the uneven governmental responses to the crisis were a clear sign of the underlying agitation which might complicate future U.S. policy in the region. In other words, the emerging regional order combines a complex array of contradictory new trends (ibid.).In light of the Arab uprisings, it is highly important to range political and economic reform. However, pushing reform complicates ties with key autocratic partners, may cause a nationalist backlash in some democratizing states, and may also risk empowering Islamist groups less inclined to cooperate with the US (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51).ConclusionA major question that remains to be answered is whether the uprisings will eventually lead to the democratization of the Middle East and the end of the one-man rule that has undermined its political life (Dalacoura, 2012 79).On the one hand, the most immediate prospects for the Arab Spring are continuing instabilities as states try to solve their political and economic situations, as sound as their relations with other countries rising influence for those countries with the necessary resources to back up their policies and the continuation of a visible but attenuated role for the U.S. (Keiswetter, 2012 2). The long-run prospect, on the other hand, includes also the possibility Middle East with a much high degree of freedom, more democratic, prosperous and accountable, less abusive of human rights, and thus a net positive outcome for U.S. interests (ibid.). With the striking rise in popular activism appoint by the new technologies, it is clear that long-term stability in the region will require meaningful steps by all governments towards a genuine political and economic reform (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 42). The U.S. has had to tread a fine line between support for its values and long-term interests represented by political reform in the region-, and the vindication of its core regional interests (Kitchen, 2012 57).If the U.S. is serious about turning off its Middle detour, then in the Middle East and North Africa the US needs to prioritize long-term trends over short-term concerns, which may not always mean pushing for revolutionary change in support of democratic values in the region (Kitchen, 2012 58).The late(a) revolutions pose an fortune to establish a new status quo in the Middle East, free an oppressed and jobless youth, increase economic standing and trade, and give democracy a chance to flourish. 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